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Modelling Normative Awareness: First Considerations
Paul Rauwolf1 and Tina Balke2 and Marina De Vos3
Abstract.
As software agents are being employed in more complex situa-
tions, experimental findings in the social sciences are becoming in-
creasingly relevant to the computational sciences. The social scien-
tific concept of situation awareness is now being utilized to quantify
the success of an agent’s environmental perceptual comprehension
and causative processing. In this paper, we suggest that awareness
of one’s situation is not sufficient to succeed in navigating the grow-
ing complexity of agent-based social interactions. In human societies
norms (personal, legal, and social) have emerged as multi-faceted
mechanisms for prescriptive pressures projected onto individual’s be-
liefs and intentionality. Here we define the term normative aware-
ness as the perceptual comprehension of norms and the prediction of
the causative effect of actions on norms. In this paper, we suggest
that such awareness of the creation and perpetuation of norms would
prove advantageous to agent-based research and review to what ex-
tent the multi-agent system literature has implicitly utilized the con-
cept of normative awareness. We recognize that a ubiquitous merger
of the vernacular between the social and computational sciences is
unnecessary, as such, we discuss when and how normative aware-
ness should be extended to agent-based modelling and multi-agent
systems.
1 A Case for Modelling Normative Awareness
Situation awareness, which includes perceptual processing, compre-
hension, and causative predictions [23], is a foundational skill in
generating useful human action selection mechanisms. Recently, this
concept has been projected onto the study of computational agents
(see [42, 30, 31] for example), permitting quantified measurements
of awareness, and thus opening a dialogue of the utility therein. How-
ever, the instantiation of multiple agents within the computational
arena may lead to further complexities than those described in the
situational awareness literature. Thus, we define a new term, norma-
tive awareness as projected onto the situation awareness definition,
as the perceptual processing, comprehension, and causative predic-
tions of norms.
The social interactions inherent in multi-agent systems generate
normative complexities analogous to those described in the social
sciences. Rather than perceiving a situation and processing the po-
tential consequences of an action in isolation, agent’s performance is
increased through deftly navigating social nuances. Historically, hu-
mans have employed norms (personal, social and legal) in manoeu-
vring the complexities of social interactions. Successful navigation
has thus been aided by awareness of the propensity of others to as-
cribe to such norms, as well as a prediction of the beliefs and inten-
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tionality of others. It has even been argued that avoiding sanctions,
weeding out defectors, and the emergence of cooperation could be
linked to society’s tendency to instantiate and navigate norms[35].
We suggest, that as situation awareness is being employed in the
agent-based literature, so too should normative awareness. We ar-
gue that agent awareness of normative underpinnings are sufficiently
unique to situational awareness as to warrant a separate definition.
Rather than simply processing environmental data, normative aware-
ness employs a limited version of Theory of Mind [7], in that agent’s
are aware that other agent’s possess awareness, intentionality, and be-
liefs. We argue that this definition transcends that of situation aware-
ness, and that a dialogue surrounding the benefits of normatively
aware agents will prove useful in grounding future agent-based re-
search.
To justify this postulation, in Section 2 we first present a brief
introduction into the social science and computational literature re-
garding situation awareness. Next, in Section 3, we define normative
awareness in reference to situation awareness. We approach this in
a multi-faceted way. In characterizing normative awareness, the se-
mantic ideology of norms is considered, since awareness of norms
begs a definition of norms. The definition, utility, creation, and per-
petuation of norms (within the social sciences) are thus inspected,
and while debate continues, a broad spectrum of arguments are con-
sidered. The goal is not to cement a rigid criteria for norms, but rather
to discuss the breadth of research in order to (i) augment the ground-
ing of future computational instantiations of norms in theory, and
(ii) aid in unifying the vernacular between the two disciplines. Upon
exploring norms and situation awareness, we propose a definition
of normative awareness, which amalgamates the two concepts. Sec-
tion 4 reviews the existing agent-based literature regarding norma-
tive awareness. We also discuss the gaps in usage between the social
sciences and the computational sciences, and discuss whether these
gaps need to be closed or not. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude our
discussion with a summary and an agenda for future research.
2 Situation Awareness
Situation awareness (SA) has a history of use within military avia-
tion vernacular, dating back to World War I [24]. More recently the
term has been utilized within the social [40] and computational sci-
ences [30, 42]. As this paper juxtaposes normative awareness to situ-
ation awareness, in this section we will discuss the idea of SA in more
detail. We in particular focus on the work of Mica Endsley, who is
well known for her work on SA and who defines SA as follows:
Situation Awareness - perception of the elements of the envi-
ronment within the volume of time and space, the comprehen-
sion of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the
near future [23].
Based on this definition, Endsley develops a three-layer hierarchi-
cal structure which is often referenced when discussing SA [24]:
Level 1: perception of the elements in the environment. This is the
identification of the key elements or “events” that, in combination,
serve to define the situation. This level tags key elements of the sit-
uation semantically for higher levels of abstraction in subsequent
processing.
Level 2: comprehension of the current situation. This is the combi-
nation of level 1 events into a comprehensive holistic pattern, or
tactical situation. This level serves to define the current status in
operationally relevant terms in support of rapid decision making
and action.
Level 3: projection of future status. This is the projection of the cur-
rent situation into the future in an attempt to predict the evolution
of the tactical situation. This level supports short-term planning
and option evaluation when time permits.
Endsley’s hierarchical nature of the SA theory has lent itself well
to the computational sciences, permitting the awareness of an agent
to be discussed in a grounded way. The notion has been utilized in
coordinating agents operating within service based systems [42], as
well as formally quantifying the awareness of an agent via its ability
to complete truth tables in a particular context [30]. Additionally,
situation awareness has been employed in the creation of military
tactical plans through agent-based modelling [31].
However, as much as increasing SA augments predictive ability
for potential actions, it does not offer a holistic theory to guide ac-
tion selection mechanisms. When one is highly situationally aware,
one accurately perceives and comprehends the environmental con-
text. This permits veracious projection of the consequences of a given
action. But, what action will be selected? What is one’s motive? So-
cial theorist Paul Stern argues that situation awareness is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for social movement [39]. He suggests
that the motivational impetus to act often portrays itself as a sense
of obligation, or a personal norm. Thus, to Stern, social movement
requires (i) the ability to predict the future outcomes of actions uti-
lizing situation awareness, and (ii) awareness of which actions and
direction one wishes to push society (i.e. awareness of one’s per-
sonal norms and goals). This suggests that awareness of norms adds
an additional layer to interpreting a situation juxtaposed to a solely
situationally aware agent. Furthermore it requires an understanding
of the link between the SA awareness of the agent and the interpreta-
tion of this situation (e.g.action, observations,. . . with respect to the
norms of the society.)
This presence of norms as motivational factors in human and
multi-agent societies may complicate the notion of awareness.
Should an agent be aware of normative societal underpinnings? If
the awareness of norms enhances the ability to project future status,
does such a notion fall under the banner of situational awareness?
In the next section we discuss the definition of norms, and in that at-
tempt to diagnose the utility of diverging the definitions of situational
and normative awareness within multi-agent systems.
3 Normative Awareness in the Social Sciences
3.1 Definition of Normative Awareness
If Endsley’s situation awareness theory is projected onto norms, then
normative awareness is the (i) perception of norms, (ii) comprehen-
sion of norms, and (iii) ability to predict future system states given
norms. However, this definition is unsatisfactory without semantic
cohesion. What is a norm? Can awareness of norms be implemented
as a subset of situation awareness? Is a norm a situation?
To answer these, first, we will describe the breadth of the social
scientific usage of the term “norm”. Next, we will briefly discuss
theories on the creation and perpetuation of norms. In the end we will
present an argument that while Level 1 and 2 situation and normative
awareness may prove indistinct, it is only in understanding an agent’s
effect on the norm that an agent will attain level three awareness,
future projection. It is postulated that level three normative awareness
requires at least a limited version of theory of mind, in that the agent
must predict motivation’s and actions of other agent’s based on their
goals and beliefs.
3.2 Definition of Norm
Before delving into the nuances of normative literature, it may prove
useful to reiterate our intention. In discussing social science’s utiliza-
tion of the term norm, our goal is not to reach a conclusion on a def-
inition still debated or to get mired in a semantic argument. Rather,
in articulating the breadth of the terminology it may yield the knowl-
edge requisite to deliberate upon the utility of passing aspects of the
vernacular into the computational arena. Additionally, in acknowl-
edging the historic debate and precedent, multi-agent systems can
ground itself in existing theory.
In a general sense, the social science literature considers norms to
be prescriptive and proscriptive [9]. There are actions which ought
to be employed and actions which ought not. This pressure may be
placed on the self, in which case it is considered a personal norm. In
contrast, social norms are rules that are:
neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or
legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet
[are] regularly complied with (otherwise it would not be a rule)
[36].
Some, however, argue that this notion of the burden of enforce-
ment leads to an even further refined differentiation in the nomencla-
ture. The term ”convention” has been employed to describe a Nash
equilibrium of a cooperative game [34]. Though there may be mul-
tiple equilibria, once convergence reaches a certain threshold, it is
rarely in one’s interest to defect. For instance, walking on the “incor-
rect” side of a footpath seldom requires social sanctions as the defec-
tive act is cost prohibitive. In general, conventions “...provide people
with means of knowing what to expect of each other and thereby
serving to coordinate interactions [41].”
Bicchieri [9] argues a social norm is a mechanism which alters
a mixed-motive game4 into a cooperation game. For instance, nor-
mative prescriptions and the potential for sanctions might alter the
cost/benefit utilities of a context analogous to a prisoner’s dilemma
game [5] (where cooperation is not a Nash equilibrium5) into a situ-
ation where cooperation is a Nash equilibrium. Such instances typi-
cally require sanctions in order to manipulate the topology of utility
function. For example, the utility of attempting to steal is altered de-
pending on the consequences of being caught.
While the differentiation in the governance of the norms has led
to a distinction between personal, social, and legal norms, these def-
initions still blur [9]. Stern argues that personal (rather than social)
4 A mixed-motive game consists in a game where the best pay-off for at least
one of the players does not lead to the best pay-off for the other.
5 A Nash equilibrium is a state in game theory where, if all other players do
not alter their action, it is not beneficial for any one player to alter their
action.
norms are required to change the social landscape precisely because
the status quo being overthrown typically involves a relatively ubiq-
uitous social norm [40]. The delineation proves a bit more semantic
when considering whether a personalized social norm is both a per-
sonal and a social norm, or a social norm enacted through an individ-
ual.
Additionally, the definition and delineation between legal and so-
cial norms presented above are under dispute. Conte and Castel-
franchi argue that colloquially it is accepted that behaviour is not
sufficient for defining accepted prescriptive pressures. They suggest
that just because people throw their rubbish out the window does not
suggest that people ought to throw their rubbish out the window [15].
However, if normative prescription does not alter behaviour and
sanctions, then how could it alter mixed-motive situations? Further-
more, Fehr and Fischbacher argue that legal norms only exist as a
epiphenomena of social norms.
Legal enforcement mechanisms cannot function unless they are
based on a broad consensus about the normative legitimacy of
the rules – in other words, unless the rules are backed by social
norms. Moreover, the very existence of legal enforcement insti-
tutions is itself a product of prior norms about what constitutes
appropriate behaviour [27].
This need for broad consensus has even lead to some paradoxical
interplay between laws and social norms. In Alabama, a law outlaw-
ing adultery was not repealed due to the presumed political difficulty
in passing the legislation, despite strong sentiment against enforce-
ment [29]. While a law, is it a legal norm or social norm? If law is
not legislatively enforced, should a person or agent care? In this ex-
ample, was law being employed as a mechanism for disseminating
social norms even without the threat of legal sanctions? Is the law
there as a referent to the possibility of social sanctions? Is there an
expectation or a utility in being aware of the legislation?
3.3 Creation of Norms
In discussing the definition of norms it may help to acknowledge the
debate regarding normative generation. How and when are norms
created? Is there some tipping point in terms of percentage of the
population that generates enough pressure to alter the social land-
scape? When does societal preference lead to societal pressure?
Bicchieri [8] suggests that the creation of norms are analogous
to the formation of language. Namely, she argues that the prescrip-
tive and proscriptive pressures underlying normative interaction are
similar to the grammatical structure in language in that neither were
the result of human planning, but rather emerged. Conte and Castel-
franchi [15] posit that, while norms are spoken of definitively, nor-
mative pressure and thus the existence of a norm lies on a contin-
uum consisting of how pervasively people (i) behaviourally conform,
(ii) believe they should conform, (iii) are spatially distributed.
Additionally, they discuss the differentiation in the literature be-
tween the epiphenomenal and evolutionary generation of norms.
While the epiphenomenal explanation relates to the game theoretic
conversation, the evolutionary approach argues that norms are gener-
ated due to bounded rationality. By implementing prescriptive mech-
anisms agents can limit the need to diagnose other agent intention-
ality as well as comprehending the repercussions of complex social
interaction [15]. It is even been argued that the advent of social norms
offers the advantage of reducing the need to think [25].
As previously mentioned, Fehr and Fischbacher suggest that legal
norms are only begotten through the consequences of social norms.
However, the interaction between social and legal norm creation are
recursive. Scott [38] notes that once a legal norm is established soci-
ety may adopt it as a social norm even if the legal establishment does
not provide it is typical sanctions for defection. For example, a “no
smoking” sign may generate social sanctions (e.g. shaming) even if
the governance which placed the sign does not police the policy.
3.4 Perpetuation of Norms
Lastly, a definition of norms should consider the perpetuation and
declination of norms. When is a norm no longer a norm? Legal pos-
itivism argues that the validity of a law’s existence need not require
general social consent, rather if the authority responsible for legisla-
tion pens a new law, it is a law. This is in contrast to the argument
that laws may be abrogated due to desuetude (i.e. disuse, or not be-
ing enforced) [29]. This ideological disparity becomes relevant when
considering multi-agent systems, and whether defecting against a pri-
ori norms (even if desuetude) always constitute a violation, and thus
advocates awareness. Thus far, there is a propensity in mult-agent
systems field to invoke legal positivism, in that defection is always
“illegal” [17].
More definitively, a social norm ceases to exist if no one expects
anyone else to employ it. Thus, the consequences to a norm given
an agent’s action depends on the type of norm, and potentially (i.e.
in the case of legal norms) the ideology grounding the norm. If an
agent defects against a legal norm by the legal positivist definition,
the norm remains unaffected. Conversely, if an agent defects against
a social norm, the strength of the norm is affected [15].
Additionally, if agent behaviour, at least in part, defines and per-
petuates norms, then it is not solely the decision to defect which alters
the strength of the norm, but also the agent’s propensity to sanction
defectors. Even further, an agent’s tendency to sanction agent’s who
refuse to sanction may aid in perpetuating the norm [4].
Thus, at least in the case of personal, social, and legal (given ab-
rogation via desuetude) norms, perpetuation is dependant upon agent
belief and, arguably, action. Therefore, awareness of norms is en-
hanced via awareness of one’s and other’s beliefs.
3.5 Leading toward Normative Awareness
Having briefly noted the breadth of the literature regarding norms,
it is more feasible to discuss the implications of normative aware-
ness. First, it is necessary to decide whether there is any difference
between situation and normative awareness. If such a valuable dis-
tinction is uncovered, then the utility of normative awareness may be
debated.
We suggest that there is little value in differentiating the two forms
of awareness at the first two levels. An agent who is level 1 and
2 normatively aware is essentially situationally aware. To perceive
and comprehend normative prescriptions is not usefully distinct from
perceiving and comprehending environmental situations in that per-
ception and comprehension of norms is an environmental situation.
However, we believe that the concepts diverge at level three aware-
ness, such that level three normative awareness constitutes level three
situation awareness, plus awareness of personal and other agent’s
motivations and normative restrictions.
As previously mentioned, Endsley’s third level of situation aware-
ness elucidates the consequences of actions, but does not consider
which action to select. On an individual level, Stern suggests that so-
cial movement not only requires situation awareness, but also aware-
ness of one’s personal norms [40]. Thus, at a personal level, third
level normative awareness includes not only the ability to predict, but
also the knowledge that one wishes to act. In other words, awareness
of one’s personal norms offers more information than simply the po-
tential consequences of taking an action, it suggests what action will
be taken. High situation awareness garners accurate predictions of
consequences given an action, while personal normative awareness
also posits which actions could be taken.
Furthermore, at a social normative level (or legal normative level
sans legal positivism) it has been argued that the perpetuation of a
given norm must be dependent, to some extent, on agent behaviour.
As such, if one’s action effects the perpetuation of a norm, it also ef-
fects the creation of a norm, even if the new norm is not perpetuating
the old norm (i.e. new norm B is not acting upon or sanctioning old
norm A). Thus, for normative awareness to reach level three situa-
tional awareness (i.e. projection of future status), then an agent must
be aware of other agent’s ability to affect norms, and thus there is
utility in the cognizance of motivation and goals.
It could potentially still be argued that normative awareness is a
subset of situation awareness, in that awareness of the environment
includes awareness of other people’s motivations, beliefs, and po-
tential for sanctioning. Why confound the terminology when one
could potentially extend the definition of situation awareness to in-
clude beliefs, etc? We suggest that, even if normative awareness is
reduced to a subset of situation awareness, the nuanced and complex
effects of beliefs will present unique problems. Even if one remains
unconvinced in the semantic delineation between normative and sit-
uation awareness, evolution seems to have handled the differentia-
tion through unique neurological processes. Leda Cosmides demon-
strated that we are better able to draw logical inferences when the
data is set in social rather than mathematical contexts [18]. Analo-
gously, when syntactically instantiating multi-agent models, the pro-
cessing of beliefs and the prediction of other agent’s beliefs are typi-
cally unique modules compared to the algorithms employed for situ-
ation awareness. In other words, the programmed modules for situa-
tion awareness, and processing other agent’s beliefs and motivations
will likely prove different modules. Thus, even if semantically the
concepts can be amalgamated, practically they may be programmed
separately, which then creates utility in semantically differentiating
the algorithms which will prove conceptually distinct.
3.6 Utility of Normative Awareness
From a utility perspective, advanced normative awareness is likely
beneficial. Although, in certain circumstances this can be argued. If
legal norms exist, but are desuetude, then awareness may prove dele-
terious from the standpoint of cognitive load.
Furthermore, in human society lacking normative awareness can
sometimes protect one from sanctions. Children, and the mentally
disabled are often given a reprieve from the social effects of defection
given ignorance. This has raised philosophical debates regarding the
norm of sanctioning, including whether psychopaths should be pun-
ished if they can not differentiate between conventions and morality
[33], or whether one can avoid social and legal sanctions by claiming
emotional distress (e.g. temporary insanity)?
While these arguments are potentially rare and nuanced occur-
rences in human society, philosophically they are useful in discussing
normative awareness in the computational arena. Laws, which are al-
ways human constructs in the real world, are not always agent con-
structs in the agent world - they may be designed by humans. If all
agents defect from a law, is it useful to be aware of it? Addition-
ally, awareness of one’s capacity for awareness has been integrated
into a human understanding of norms, but what about within multi-
agent systems? If agents are homogeneous in their capability, then
perhaps it is a non-issue. But, how should agents be developed when
one agent is capable of a deeper normative awareness than another?
Should the more advanced agent sanction the other even though the
agent will never comprehend the situation? If not, should a capable
agent pretend ignorance? Would such a situation ever prove useful?
4 Computation Models of Normative Awareness
Having discussed the concept of norms and normative awareness and
having projected it onto the situational awareness levels by Endsley,
in this section we now shift our focus to the computational modelling
of normative awareness. For this purpose, we start by reviewing the
literature on current (computational) models of normative agents6.
4.1 Literature Review
Turning to the normative agent architectures first, the most prominent
ones found in the literature are BOID [11], NoA [32], BRIDGE [20],
deliberative normative agents [12], EMIL-A [2] and the NBDI archi-
tecture [19, 22].
Of these different frameworks, BOID does consider agents rea-
soning about norms, but it is assumed that all norms are known to
the agents. Normative awareness as such is therefore not considered,
but what we refer to as Level 1 and 2 normative awareness is au-
tomatically assumed. This is similarly true for NoA and BRIDGE.
Although Dignum et al. state that “A person may be aware of a norm
. . . ”, but do not explore the issue further.
The idea of deliberate normative agents is based on earlier works
in cognitive science (e.g. [15, 16]). Similar to BOID it focuses on
the idea that social norms need to be accounted for in the decision
making process of an agent.
As a result of the complexity of the tasks associated with social
norms, [12] argue that they cannot simply be implicitly represented
as constraints or external fixed rules in an agent architecture, but
they suggest that norms should also be represented as mental objects,
which have their own mental representation [14] and should interact
in several ways with the other mental objects (e.g. beliefs and desires)
and plans of an agent. Looking at the generation of these mental ob-
jects, they result from an internalization process by the agents that is
briefly outlined in [12]. For the internalization, when agents are in a
social setting, norms are immediately recognized as such (either by
observation or communication) and agents can determine to internal-
ize them, i.e. to incorporate them into their own decision making or
not (depending on their attitude towards the specific norms and its
consequences). This decision making mainly incorporates the ideas
of Level 1 and 2 normative awareness, i.e. the agent – as in the pre-
viously mentioned architectures – focuses on the question to what
extend the norms will affect its own behaviour, but does not neces-
sarily consider its effect on other agents.
The idea of the internalization process described in [12], as well
as the actual recognition of norms as such is extended in the EMIL-A
architecture [2, 3], which uses a specific norm recognizer module for
the latter. This module distinguishes two different scenarios: (i) in-
formation it knows about and has classified as a norm before and
(ii) new (so far unknown) normative information.
6 In our review of models of normative agents, except for [6] we neglect
models focusing on designing normative frameworks such as the eInsti-
tutions [26, 28], InstAL [13], OperA [21],MOISEIns [10],. . . as these
tend to focus on the normative architecture, rather than the agents and their
reasoning.
In the former case, i.e. the agent receiving an external normative
input it is already aware of, the normative input is entrenched on a so-
called normative board (which captures the long-term and working
memory of an agent) where it is ordered by salience. Here, salience
[1] refers to the degree of activation of a norm, i.e. how often the
respective norm has been used by the agent for action decisions or
how often it has been invoked. The norms stored on the normative
board are then considered in the classical BDI decision process as
restrictions on the goals and intentions of the agent. In this process
the salience of a norms is important, as in case of conflict (i.e. sev-
eral norms applying to the same situation), the norm with the highest
salience level is chosen.
In case the external normative input is new, i.e. not previously
known to the agent, the agent needs to internalize it first before being
able to apply it in any of its decision making. For this purpose the
normative frame is activated. The normative frame is equipped with
a dynamic schema (a frame of reference) which is used to recog-
nize and categorize an external input as being normative based on its
properties. Properties that the normative frame takes into account are
for example deontic specifications, information about the locus from
which the norm emanates or information about legitimate reactions
or sanctions to transgression of the norm7. The recognition of a norm
by an agent does not necessarily imply that the agent will agree with
the norm or that it understands it fully, it only means that the agent
has classified the new information as a norm. After this initial recog-
nition of the external input as a norm, the normative frame is used
to find an interpretation of the new norm. This is done by checking
the agent’s knowledge for information about variables of the frame
of reference for example. Once enough information is gathered about
the new norm and the agent is able to determine its meaning and im-
plication, the newly recognized norm is turned into a normative be-
lief. Again, normative beliefs by an agent do not imply that the agent
will follow the respective norm, instead it is a candidate for a norm
that the agent might adopt. With respect to the adoption of norms,
in EMIL-A agents follow a “why not” approach. This means that an
agent has a slight preference to adopt a new norm if it cannot find ev-
idence that this new norm conflicts with its existing mental objects.
Adopted normative beliefs are stored as normative goals. These nor-
mative goals are considered in the agent’s decision making. An agent
does not need to follow all normative goals it has when making a de-
cision, but can violate norms. When deciding whether to follow a
norm, EMIL-A assumes that an agent will try to conform with its
normative goals if it does not have reasons for not doing so. As in the
previous agent architectures, level 1 and 2 only.
A different approach to the one of EMIL-A concerning the iden-
tification of emergent norms (levels 1 and 2) without the norm ex-
plicitly being given to the agent is presented by Savarimuthu et al.
[37]. The authors present an approach to use data mining mecha-
nisms to identify prohibition and obligation norms, however stop af-
ter the norm identification, i.e. they do not account for level 3 either.
One of the few normative architectures which allows for incorpo-
rating considerations on how other agents react to norms (i.e. the re-
quirement for level 3 normative awareness) is presented in [6]. In this
architecture, using queries, (via an intermediary) the agents can ask
about the norms of the system (and in particular the ones applying to
them) as well as pose queries about the effects of their own actions
or the actions of others with respect to a desired outcome. One ex-
ample of a query presented in the paper is whether a particular state
can be reached depending on the actions of others if the agent itself
7 A detailed list of properties being considered by the normative frame can
be found in [1].
performs a particular (sequence of) action(s). In contrast to the agent
architectures described earlier, the work presented in [6] has its main
focus on the normative framework, rather then the internal reasoning
of agents.
As a result, the norms the agents deal with are indirectly assumed
to be predefined legal norms. Social norms that are emerging in the
course of the interaction of the agents are not considered. With re-
spect to obtaining normative information, the agents in the system
need to make a conscious decision to ask for normative information,
no information is passed on to the agents without a query action ini-
tiated by them. The authors point out that the information gathered
by their queries can be adopted by the agents in the form of percepts
of the environment and then considered in the agent decision mak-
ing process. This “recognition” of information via the environment
is in line with the idea of perceiving a situation (of which norms are
a part of) by the agents. However, this does not include any consid-
eration as to which norms an agent internalizes and how it uses the
knowledge obtained with the help of the queries in [6]. At present a
general methodology or formalisation of the approach presented in
[6] is missing.
Inspiration for such an agent architecture might be drawn from
the NBDI agent architecture [19, 22]. This architecture includes a
Norm Recognition module, which agents can use to either implicitly
(via observations) or explicitly (via communication) learn about new
norms. The architecture proposes bridge rules for norm internaliza-
tion and considers different agent behavioural types (with respect to
the adoption of norms). Again the architecture is very limited with re-
spect to considering other agent’s reactions towards norms, i.e. level
3.
4.2 Gaps and Challenges
Having reviewed existing normative (agent) architectures, it is appar-
ent that at this stage, no model incorporating all three level of nor-
mative awareness exists. Thus, although some work has been done
on norm emergence in terms of explaining how an agent decides
whether it adopts a norm or not, – except for EMIL-A and the ar-
chitecture described in [6] – most architectures assume that norms
are automatically detected (either via observation or communication)
and questions on whether something is a norm are not being asked
by the agents. Furthermore, the information on norms is typically
only reflected on the agents themselves and a lack of consideration
of level 3 normative awareness can be found.
As pointed out before, the level 3 normative awareness indirectly
implemented in [6] focuses on predefined norms specified at a sys-
tems level and thus lacks the incorporation of norms emerging via
social interplay. As a consequence no need for normative awareness
outside of situation awareness is required in that architecture. This
focus on predefined norms is however not uncommon in the (norma-
tive) multi-agent literature. Whereas in human societies legal, social,
and personal norms are human constructs, often in the computational
arena norms are not defined by the agents, but they are designed into
the system, which was designed mostly with a particular purpose in
mind. As such the question arises on whether the specific account-
ing of the social norms emerging from social interactions between
agents and the emergence thereof does always need to be considered
when designing a computational model of normative awareness? Is
it sufficient to embed normative awareness in situational awareness
if only legal norms defined into a system are considered?
Even if this notion is sufficient, another question arises as a re-
sult of our literature review. Looking at the architectures considering
agents incorporating normative information in their decision mak-
ing, in these architectures little information was provided on the in-
tentionality of agents. What makes an agent actively try to perceive
norms and to incorporate them into its decision-making?
Furthermore, looking at existing models of agent decision making,
the models normally assume that individual agents have a fixed set of
goals (desires) that they wish to achieve. This, however, makes it hard
to account for the high levels of adherence to norms and cooperation
found in human societies (e.g. the ultimatum game). We discussed
Theory of Minds earlier on, which as one aspect implies that humans
have a ’built-in’ ability to understand and share the (normative) in-
tentions of others. The incorporation of such a “we-intentionality”
in agent reasoning cannot, at the moment, be found in agent archi-
tectures. Consequently – from the agents’ perspective – an important
prerequisite for level 3 normative awareness is missing.
Finally, there are some aspects of the emergence of norms in bio-
logical society, which, though potentially not presently relevant, may
become more so as agent-based research evolves. For instance, most
agents are clones, and thus, are imbued with the same capacity for in-
formational and causative processing as their conspecifics. As such,
the aspect of normative underpinnings which derived through the
interactions of heterogeneity may be ignored in the computational
arena. However, this may not prove a static assumption, and when
heterogeneity is employed within multi-agent systems, it may prove
advantageous to look to the study of the social sciences in order to
ground multi-agent research.
5 Summary and Research Agenda
In this paper we discussed the definition, utility, and difficulty in
modelling normative awareness for software agents. Our intention
was to initiate a dialogue which considers the utility of agent aware-
ness of the normative infrastructure, and how normative awareness
differs from situation awareness. To this end, we started off by giv-
ing a definition of situation awareness based on Endsley [24] as well
as looking into the concept and related properties of norms. Starting
from the individual concepts, we juxtaposed the two ideas to identify
where the ideas overlapped and where further considerations were
required. We identified that the main difference between situation
and normative awareness resided in what we referred to as level 3
normative awareness. Namely, advanced level 3 normative aware-
ness requires a limited instantiation of Theory of Mind, in that, espe-
cially in social norms, the norms which pressure an agent’s actions
are affected by other agent’s intentionality and awareness. Thus an
awareness that other’s have their own beliefs improves an agent’s
awareness of the norms.
When reviewing existing literature on normative multi-agent sys-
tems concerning their incorporation of normative awareness, it be-
came evident that at present not only do most systems assume gen-
eral awareness of all norms, but that level 3 normative awareness
is normally not really considered. The reason for that is the lack of
models of (shared) intentionality of agents, which we perceive as the
most important step in our research agenda for modelling normative
awareness.
A question which was raised in our analysis was whether com-
putational models of normative awareness always need this distinc-
tion from situational awareness. Especially in cases in which norms
are legal norms respecified in a system and not social norms emerg-
ing from social interaction, the perception of norms via the environ-
ment as part of the situation might be sufficient. Even if this is suf-
ficient, current models such as [6] pursuing this approach need to
adapt their focus from the normative system perspective to a more
agent-centered perspective exploring in more detail how and under
which circumstances an agent will generate an intention and perform
an action to actively query the norms of the system it inhabits. This
is therefore the second point on our research agenda: a formalisation
of the work presented in [6] as well as the development of a general
methodology for the above mentioned processes.
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